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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Although the prohibition of the desecration of national symbols is not the
same as compelling acts of allegiance, such a prohibition may be going be-
yond the limits of persuasion and example.
Despite Barnette, however, the dissenters in Street seem to have as-
serted that there is a legitimate and substantial governmental interest in
promoting patriotism by means of national symbols. In saying that
desecration of the flag can be proscribed, Chief Justice Warren spoke of
the "power to protect the flag from acts of desecration and disgrace" 7
rather than a power to avoid the disruption attendant an act of abusing
the flag. Justice Fortas, moreover, termed the flag "a special kind of per-
sonalty ...burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions."5 8
From the emphatic nature of the dissenting opinions, from lower court
decisions sustaining flag-desecration statutes and from the lack of any
strong precedent upholding such activity, the majority's refusal to meet
the issue of flag-burning should be taken as a rejection of Street's con-
tention that such an avenue of expression is protected by the first amend-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court should realize that there are many factors
in favor of expanding the first amendment's protection to include peaceful
symbolic communication of any kind. Moreover, the recognition of an
interest in promoting patriotic values should be a very limited one, for
such an interest could lead to the kind of enforced conformity that is ab-
horrent to a system of government founded upon individual rights.
WILIAm M. TROTT
Corporations-Voting Trusts-Should Trust Principles Apply
to Close Corporations?
Ever since the corporate form of doing business became prevalent
around the turn of the century, the attorney for the close corporation has
been troubled by many difficult problems; and in trying to solve them, he
has been "hampered by doctrines which are meaningful only in the con-
text of the large, publicly held company."' One of these problems is that
of providing some method for ensuring continuity and stability of man-
agement when no one stockholder, or faction of stockholders, owns a ma-
jority of voting stock. Another is that of providing means for resolving
5 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1968).
58 Id. at 616-17.
'Note, Close Corporations: Voting Trust Legislation and Resolution of Dead-
locks, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 590 (1967).
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deadlocks if two stockholders or factions each own half of the voting
stock, or if there are high voting or quorum requirements with no stock-
holder or faction owning enough stock to meet them. As a practical
matter, such difficulties do not arise in the widely-held corporation,
"[w]here the shareholder . . . is rarely able to exercise any meaningful
control"2 and the "ability of management... to sustain itself.., is a fact
of economic life."' In the close corporation, however, a slight shift of
stock ownership or the lost alliance of only one voting shareholder can
transfer control of the corporation to a competing faction; and if the
voting power resides in two equally-divided groups, deadlock is always a
threat. Furthermore, when close corporations have been unsuccessful in
preventing such deadlocks or crippling disputes and litigation results, the
courts generally have been unable satisfactorily to resolve them because
of inadequate statutory remedies.4
A recent Massachusetts case, Selig v. Wexler,5 presents a classic ex-
ample of an unsuccessful use of the voting trust to prevent deadlock and
ensure stability. It also illustrates the inability of the court to satisfac-
torily deal with the problem because it felt constrained to apply trust law
in the absence of other statutory provisions dealing specifically with this
area of corporate control.
Selig involved a manufacturing corporation whose stock was owned
equally by plaintiff Selig and defendant Wexler. The two owners, often
unable to agree on the management policy of the corporation, entered into
a voting trust agreement whereby all of the stock was placed in trust,
and the owners and the corporate counsel, Mr. Riemer, were selected
trustees. Riemer was considered a neutral trustee-director possessing the
tie-breaking vote. This arrangement allowed the corporation to function
smoothly, even to prosper, for about eight years. Selig, however, was not
content. Riemer, the "neutral" trustee, constantly sided with Wexler.6
Two years before the agreement was to expire, Wexler and Riemer
urged that it be renewed; and after extensive negotiations, during which
both parties were represented by counsel and business advisors,1 a new
'Note, The Voting Trust: California Erects a Barrier to a Rational Law of
Corporate Control, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1210, 1215 (1966).
aId. 1212.
'In most states the only remedy is dissolution. See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE COR-
PoAviOxs § 9.29 (1958).
'- Mass. - , 247 N.E.2d 567 (1969).
0 Id. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 569.
"Brief for Appellant at 25, Selig v. Wexler, - Mass. - , 247 N.E.2d 567
(1969).
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voting trust agreement was executed. It provided for an additional di-
rector to resolve deadlocks by means of a rather intricate formula.8 Both
Selig and Wexler entered into lifetime employment contracts with the
corporation, and the agreement provided that the trust was to continue at
least until the death of the survivor.9 Thus both Selig and Wexler, who
apparently had complete knowledge of what the agreement entailed, ir-
revocably bound themselves to abide by it for the remainder of their lives.
The trust remained in effect for about two years. Selig again grew
dissatisfied because Riemer and Silverman, the two supposedly neutral
directors, always sided with Wexler." After Selig attempted without
success' to take control at the annual meeting, when the terms of the
two neutral directors were to expire, he brought suit against Wexler and
Riemer and asked the court to terminate the trust.
The trial court, apparently without authority to provide specific posi-
tive relief, ordered that if the voting trust could be amended within sixty
days so as to provide for a truly neutral trustee and one or more neutral
directors, the bill would be dismissed.12 Since no amendment was made,
the court granted the termination requested by Selig, and the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts affirmed. 8
After finding that the neutral directors had in fact been partial, and
that this lack of impartiality frustrated the trust's purposes, the court set
forth the principles of law on which it based its decision to terminate the
trust:
'The agreement provided that there would continue to be eight directors,
three chosen by Selig, three by Wexler, plus Riemer and Silverman [the
company accountant]. . . . The neutral directors were to be chosen by a
vote of four of the five trustees. In the event of an impasse, the Com-
pany's by-laws were to be amended to provide for an [sic] ninth director.
The directors then in office would attempt to choose the seventh, eight,
and ninth directors from six nominees, three nominated by Selig and three
by Wexler. Each such nominee had to be either a Company officer earning
at least $15,000 a year or a former director. Every director was required
to cast a vote for four different nominees. If this procedure also produced
a deadlock, then a selection was to be made from the nominees by lot.
The voting trustees, as required by the agreement, would then elect the
candidates so chosen.
- Mass. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 570.
Id.
0Id. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 571.
Id. Selig had the two members of his family who were directors resign in
order to be eligible for election as "neutral' directors under the deadlock-breaking
plan. These vacancies were to be filled by other members of the Selig family.
Wexler prevented this action by adjourning the meeting.




There is no question that voting trusts are valid in this Common-
wealth. The rules of trust law in general apply to voting trusts,
unless the terms of the trust agreement provide otherwise. Undoubted-
ly a trust may be terminated if the purposes for which it was created
become impossible of accomplishment. We are of the opinion that
under this principle a voting trust may likewise be terminated when
its purposes have become frustrated or impossible. 14
The court then stated that impossibility and frustration are not exactly
the same, and that although it was not impossible to carry out the terms
of the trust, its objectives had been defeated. In order to support its de-
cision, the court resorted to contract law and a Connecticut case holding
that
[t]he doctrine of frustration of purpose, which has more modern
origins . . . [than the doctrine of impossibility] excuses a promisor
in certain situations where the objectives of the contract have been
utterly defeated by circumstances arising after the formation of the
agreement .... Excuse is allowed under this rule even though there
is no impediment to actual performance. 15
It is important first to point out that the court did not declare this
trust to be invalid but held only that its purpose had been frustrated.
Assuming this determination to be correct, and assuming that the court
was justified in following the established,16 though questioned,17 authority
that the rules of trust law in general apply to voting trusts, it is necessary
to determine whether such law was correctly applied. There is much au-
thority supporting the termination of regular trusts if the purpose has been
accomplished or if such accomplishment has become impossible or il-
legal.' But the treatises, including the ones cited by the court, do not
mention frustration of purpose as a ground for termination, and Selig
appears to be the first case expressly holding that a voting trust is ter-
minable for such a reason.
I4 d. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 572-73. (Citations omitted).
Hess v. Dumouchell Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 350-51, 225 A.2d 797, 801
(1966).
"° G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRuSTES § 251 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
BOGERT]; Gose, Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts, 20
WAsH. L. REv. 129 (1945).
"See Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904);
National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 126 Misc. 753, 214 N.Y.S. 643
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
" Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 193, 196-97, 124 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1954);
BOGERT, § 1002 (2d ed. 1962) ; A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 335 (3d ed. 1967) ; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRiuSTS § 335 (1959).
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It is true that both impossibility and frustration are grounds for dis-
charge of the duty to perform a contract,'1 but no authority has been
found for extending the excuse of frustration to trust law. The case
20
cited by the court in support of its analogy to contract law does not
justify such an extension: It dealt exclusively with a contract, and no
trust was involved.
The court in Selig distinguished between the partiality of the trustee
and the frustration of the purpose of the trust as grounds for termina-
tion.21 It emphasized that the reason for termination was not Riemer's
lack of independence as a trustee, but the frustration of the trust's pur-
poses.
The decision that the trust's purposes had been frustrated was based
on the conclusion that the neutral trustee [and] the neutral directors
... were not in fact independent or impartial [and since the] existing
neutral directors . . .would be entitled to vote [and since] Riemer
and Silverman were in fact not neutral directors; therefore the pro-
cedure could not have been carried out as intended, and the purpose
of the trust was frustrated.22
Since the frustration of purpose resulted from the partisan alliance of the
neutral trustee and directors, the distinction seems technical at best. The
fiction was necessary, however, since under trust law the lack of inde-
pendence of the trustee would be grounds only for his removal23 and not
for termination of the trust since equity will not permit a trust to fail for
lack of a trustee.24 The court applied its interpretation of trust law not
only to the trustee but also to the directors; a distinction between the func-
tion of the two should have been made. That two of the existing directors
were no longer neutral would not seem to impeach the validity of the
underlying agreement by which they were elected, but would raise only
the question of their competency as directors and whether they had vio-
lated their fiduciary duty as such. Trust law would certainly not be ap-
plicable to resolve such a question. 5
" 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1322 (1950).
"0Hess v. Dumouchell Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 225 A.2d 797 (1966).
2 Mass. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 572 n.5.
22 d. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 573.
" BOGERT § 527 (2d ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 (1950).
"'Attorney Gen. v. Goodell, 180 Mass. 538, 62 N.E. 962 (1902); BOGERT § 150
(2d ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 32 (1959).
"According to corporation law, however, a removal-for-cause action can be
brought against a director by the corporation itself or by a shareholder. Cause
includes incompetency and breach of fiduciary duty. W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 351-56 (perm. ed. rev. 1969).
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The most significant aspect of Selig is the fact that the court felt
constrained to apply trust law in the first place. Without a single reference
to the principles of corporation law, the court "solved" ' what was es-
sentially a corporate power struggle. While it is true that the legal me-
chanism employed in this case was a voting "trust," substance rather than
form should control.
The voting trust was devised to avoid the effect of the anti-separation
doctrine, which invalidates any agreement or device separating irre-
vocably the voting power of stock from its ownership. Use of a trust
transfers the legal ownership of the stock, including the voting rights, to a
trustee; the stockholder receives trust certificates evidencing his "bene-
ficial ownership."2
The voting trust was designed and eventually sanctioned to effectuate
a binding separation of voting power from ownership, although re-
liance was placed on the fiction that the anti-separation doctrine is not
violated by the trust device because the vote remains with the legal
owner. This fiction only impedes analysis and should be abandoned.29
Since there is considerable evidence that such separation is no longer con-
trary to public policy when there are valid reasons for it,"0 the fiction
of the voting trust is no longer justified. When such a device is encoun-
tered, the courts should look past the trust form and consider the sub-
stance of the agreement itself.
Furthermore, it is at least questionable whether voting trusts are true
trusts."' Although the courts have generally stated that they are and
that trust law applies,"2 there is authority to the contrary. In Warren v.
Pim83 the court said:
But in truth and in essence, and for all purposes of a court of equity,
a voting trust that has for its sole object the permanent separation
2' It is quite possible that the parties are in a worse situation than before since
continued litigation is almost certain and the continued existence of this profitable
company is placed in jeopardy.
1 F. O'NEALi, CLosE CooIATioNs § 5.04, at 227 (1958)..Id. § 5.31.
29 18 STAN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1217.
o "[C]onsistency does not permit the conclusion . . . that the present public
policy of this state condemns the separation of voting rights from beneficial stock
ownership." Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 229, 222 A.2d 800, 807 (Sup. Ct.
1966). See, e.g., W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoxs § 2080, at 395-96 (perm.
ed. rev. 1969) ; 18 STAN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1212-14.
91See note 17 supra.
3"See note 16 snpra.
8'66 N.J. Eq. 353, 356, 59 A. 773, 776 (Ct. Er. & App. 1904).
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of the voting power from the substantial ownership of the shares is
not a putting of the shares in trust.
A New York court has agreed.
Equally untenable is the suggestion that the court should treat this
as a genuine trust agreement, and under general equity powers desig-
nate a trustee to effectuate its purposes. It is not a real trust agree-
ment under which equity exercises such function, but a mere voting
trust agreement.3 4
Legislatures, by commonly using the word "trustee," have implied
that voting trusts are true trusts; however, they have not been satisfied
to permit these voting agreements to be governed solely by common
trust law but have imposed restrictions completely repugnant to estab-
lished trust-law principles. Typical is the North Carolina statute" limit-
ing the duration of voting trusts to ten years and preserving for the
"beneficial owners" many of the attributes of legal owners or stock-
holders. In California the legislature has made voting trusts terminable
at will by a majority of the beneficiaries.86
Attitudes surrounding the voting trust and the restrictions placed
on them have little relevance to the close corporation.
A close corporation is, in essence, a contractual agreement among a
few shareholders; hence freedom of contract has exerted a strong in-
fluence upon the law's attitude toward such enterprises. The emerging
view is that a unanimous agreement of the shareholders should be
permitted to accomplish any lawful objective37
The basic tests of the validity of any provisions of a shareholders' agree-
ment are whether they are compatible with public policy, whether they ad-
here to state laws and the corporate charter, and whether they adversely
affect the rights of creditors or other shareholders.8 8 In Selig, the court
failed to consider the first two of these tests, and in dealing with the third,
it gave no weight to the fact that the agreement was the result of unani-
mous stockholder action.
39
" National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 126 Misc. 753, - , 214
N.Y.S. 643, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
"N.C. GE1x. STAT. §55-72 (1967).
"CAL. CoRp. CoDE §2231 (1965).
' 67 COIuLU. L. REv., supra note 1, at 596.
Morganstern, Agreements for Small Corporation Control, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 324, 327 (1968).
" See Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309, 314 (1882), in which the court
held that agreements resulting from unanimous shareholder action should be given
weight against attack. See also 1 'NAL, supra note 27, at § 5.24.
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There is evidence of a trend toward a more realistic and enlightened
view that increased contractual flexibility and freedom will be allowed
and enforced in situations involving close corporations.4" Furthermore,
indications are that the more enlightened state legislatures have recog-
nized the need for statutory provisions dealing specifically with control
problems of close corporations.41 California has a procedure42 whereby a
provisional director may be appointed by the court in case of deadlock.
This provisional director has all of the powers of other directors and is
thus able to cast the tie-breaking vote and break the deadlock.
A more far-reaching remedy is the compulsory buy-out of shares of a
dissenting stockholder. This provision was developed under section 210
of the English Companies Act of 1948,"3 and has been substantially en-
acted in Connecticut.44 It authorizes the court to order the majority
stockholder or "oppressor" shareholder to buy the injured stockholder's
shares at a fair price as determined by the court. While this remedy may
seem harsh, it does prevent the possible dissolution of a viable corpora-
tion and at the same time insures that the injured shareholders are fairly
compensated.
A third remedy, and by far the most comprehensive, is also taken
from section 210 of the English Companies Act. This provision, which
has been adopted only by South Carolina in the United States, allows the
court to "make such order or grant such relief, other than dissolution, as
in its discretion it deems appropriate."45
Selig emphasizes the need for legislation providing such remedies.
If any of these legislative solutions had been available to the court, it
would have been able to deal with the problem much more effectively and
realistically. Until such statutory remedies are available, however, court
analysis in situations involving voting trusts should deal with the sub-
" See Weil v. Beresth, 154 Conn. 12, 220 A.2d 456 (1966), in which the court
specifically enforced a shareholder agreement; Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch.
222, 222 A.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in which the court upheld a shareholder agree-
ment in a situation similar to Selig; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (Supp. 1968);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1965).
"' Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise
Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 864 (1965); accord,
Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REv. 1043 (1969).
4- CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (1965).
's Companies Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210 (1948).
"CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-384 (1961).
42 S. C. CODE ANN. § 12022.23 (Supp. 1968). Such relief includes but is not
limited to amending the by-laws; changing any resolution of the corporation;
directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation, shareholders, directors, or of-
ficers; and providing for purchase of a shareholder's stock at a fair price.
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stance of the agreement and should more accurately reflect the true nature
of the voting "trust"-a corporate control device.
TURNER VANN ADAMS
Criminal Law-Involuntary Manslaughter Arising Out of
Business Transactions
In Commonwealth v. Feinberg1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the conviction of a merchant on five counts of involuntary man-
slaughter arising out of the sale to and consumption by certain indi-
viduals of Sterno, a jelly-like substance intended for heating purposes.
Sitting without a jury, the trial court determined that the defendant knew
or should have known first, that some of his purchasers intended to con-
sume rather than to burn the substance and second, that consumption
of it could be lethal.' Evidence on the former issue was that in selling
Sterno the defendant recognized an order to "make one" as a request for
a can of Sterno to drink, often referred to Sterno as shoe polish, and fre-
quently requested customers to hide their purchased Sterno as they left
the premises.3 Directed toward the latter issue was evidence that each can
of the lethal Sterno was marked on the lid as follows: "Institutional
Sterno. Danger. Poison. Not for home use. For commercial and in-
dustrial use only."4 The chemical contents of the industrial Sterno were
not stated on the container, and the defendant was not otherwise informed
of those contents. The non-lethal Sterno that the defendant had ap-
parently been selling for some time was marked "Caution. Flammable.
For use only as a fuel."' Both containers were identical except that the
industrial Sterno did not have a paper wrap-around label.
The supreme court applied contrasting legal tests to each of these two
problems. It repeatedly stated that the defendant "knew or should have
known" that the Sterno would be lethal if consumed.' Evidence in the
nature of objective facts, such as the contrasting markings on the con-
tainers of lethal and non-lethal Sterno, supported this conclusion. Apply-
ing an objective standard, the court found that since a reasonable man
would have been aware of the poisonous nature of the Sterno, the defen-
'433 Pa. 558, 253 A.2d 636 (1969).
'Id. at - , 253 A.2d at 641.
'Commomvealth v. Feinberg, 211 Pa. Super. 100, 103 n.3, 234 A.2d 913, 914
n.3 (1967).
'Id. at 103, 234 A.2d at 914.
5Id.
8433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 641, 643, 644.
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